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The Rise of Russia’s
Cold-Water Ports
By Alex Merker, Arcadia University

I. Introduction
One of the most consistent pillars of Russian
foreign policy throughout history has been its
pursuit of warm-water ports.1 Given Russia’s
geographic positioning, ports which didn’t
freeze over during the harsh Eurasian winters
were arguably the key to its entrance as a great
power. The importance of these port cities carried into the Soviet era, as influence stretched
around the world, along with the need to project
power globally.2 However, in the age of receding
arctic ice and expanding hard and soft power
opportunities in the region, are ports such as
St. Petersburg or Sevastopol still necessary for
Russian power projection?
In this paper, I will discuss how changes
in both climate and technology are reshaping
Russian naval ambitions. In the past
twenty-five years, Russian foreign policy planners have not only had to adapt to political
changes in Europe and Asia, but also changes
with their own geography. Every year, the
ice which once dominated the Siberian coast
recedes in a slow but certain retreat as a
result of excess carbon emissions in the atmosphere. Where there were once vast swathes
of sea ice, Open Ocean has appeared in its
place. On the surface, merchant shipping can
now travel from Europe to Asia along a route
much faster and safer than those in the Indian

Ocean, while on the seabed vast newly accessible petroleum reserves are being discovered.
Together with the easy clearing of ice in ports
using icebreakers, northern cold-water ports
are quickly becoming Russia’s most valuable
assets.
The thesis of my argument is really
quite simple. As a result of the impact of climate change on access to mineral resources
and trade routes, Russia no longer needs to
pursue and control traditionally warm-water
ports to maintain its economic and military
power. To help present a clear and concise
analysis, I will refer to this thesis as the
cold-water transition theory, after the meteorological nature behind this shift in potential
foreign policy possibilities. Through detailed
analysis of these changes, theory applications,
and consideration of dissenting opinions, I
intend to prove this theory. To validate my
thesis, I will use existing academic theory to
build a foundation of credibility. The theory
that I believe best applies to my cold-water
transition thesis is offensive realism. Offensive
realism theory dictates several key points, which
fit well with current events in the Arctic Circle
involving Russia and other regional actors.
When examining any issue involving
Russia’s connection to the sea, the most obvious
starting point is to briefly consider its

“The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm.
Fukuyama, Francis, Scott Bruckner, and Sally Stoecker, Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection. Ft. Belvoir: Defense
Technical Information Center, 1987.
1
2

7

geographic positioning and climate. The
vast majority of Russian economic power is
situated far from the shore, in landlocked
population centers such as Moscow.3 Though
not a large hindrance on its own, this positioning becomes far more troublesome with
the consideration of the Eurasian climate.
With much of Russian territory straddling the
Arctic Circle, weather conditions are a serious
burden to economic development and political
expansion. Considered by many to be Russia’s
most notable feature, the Eurasian winter is
harsh and unforgiving. With temperatures
dropping as low as negative sixty-eight degrees Celsius, life can crawl to a standstill
during winter months.4
Of course, the climate conditions of the
Russian winter not only hinder travel by land,
but travel by sea as well. In the early years of
the Russian Empire, the only ports within its
territory froze over during the winter, requiring the empire to seek out warm-water ports
if it ever wished to compete on the international stage with the other European powers.
Warm-water ports can be defined as harbors
which do not freeze over at any time of the
year; while their counterpart, cold-water
ports, can be defined as harbors whose waters
freeze over during parts of the year. To address this issue and establish Russia as a true
European power, Tsar Peter the Great set out
to claim such a port. This quest resulted in
the conquest of what is modern day St. Petersburg and other warm-water port cities, events
which directly resulted in Russia’s ascendance
onto the world stage.5 These ports continue to
be economic and military centers of Russian

power, having played a pivotal role in the development of the Russian and Soviet Empires.
II. Analysis
Analysis Overview
Of course, in order to even attempt to prove
a theory that disagrees with conventional
wisdom, a great deal of evidence must be
brought in to support such claims. There are
many different factors at work in cold-water
transition theory, all of which stem from the
central belief that climate change is a real
and actively occurring shift in earth’s meteorological conditions. The resulting reduction
of arctic sea ice from rising temperatures then
creates a large number of opportunities for
Russia and the rest of the world, which will
be examined in this analysis. Such opportunities include new sea lanes, access to mineral
resources, and multi-ocean access for arctic
states, among a great many possibilities. In
this section I will use evidence to support my
claim that there exists sufficient proof that
these factors signal the beginning of the end
of Russian reliance on warm-water ports to
maintain its current position in world affairs.
Climate Change
At the very root of cold-water transition
theory is the overwhelming evidence of global
climate change.6,7 Whether it is manmade,
or a result of natural climate conditions, the
reality of climate change is nearly scientifically undeniable. This is supported by an ever
increasing
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number of scientific foundations, both national and international, coming to an agreement
that the earth’s meteorological systems are
changing.8,9,10 The process behind this is complicated, but can be simplified to a few key
points.
According to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, scientists have a
ninety-five percent certainty that the root
cause of climate change is a global increase of
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, in
the earth’s atmosphere as a result of human
and geologic activities.11 As these gases build
up in the atmosphere, they create an ever
strengthening blanket that traps heat in
energy. A similar process can be observed on
the planet Venus, albeit caused by volcanism
and on a much more dramatic scale.12 The
increased atmospheric temperature changes
both water and land temperatures, causing
glaciers and snowpack to melt at far greater
rates than can be replaced, resulting in even
more carbon dioxide being released into the
air in the process. Because of the fluidity of
earth’s weather systems, changes can be very
dynamic, causing very strong storm systems
that vary from drought to typhoons.13 Overall, these changes may appear contrary to the
term “global warming”; however, they are in
fact a strong indicator for what is a broad increase in temperature that can still result in
very strong winter weather in certain areas.
With these facts clearly laid out, it

becomes apparent that there are very genuine
changes occurring which can have a considerable impact geographically, but politically
as well. In what can be considered one of the
most immediately visible changes, the arctic
ice cap which connects with Russian Siberia
has begun to recede. According to statistics
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and backed up by numerous
published reports in well-known scientific
journals, the total area coverage of contiguous sea ice in the arctic ocean has declined
between six-seven percent every decade since
record keeping began in the 1970s.14,15 This
reduction is most pronounced in areas of
ocean and coastline claimed and owned by
Russia, with a great deal of previously impassible sections of sea now open year round.
The significance of this occurrence cannot be
underscored nearly enough, and is the basis
for cold-water transition theory..
The resulting change in ice coverage
during winter months brings an important
question: are northern cities still cold-water ports after climate change? Though the
original definition of a cold-water port would
include winter icing, this is no longer the
case. However, for the duration of this paper I
will continue to call traditionally warm-water
ports by that name, with the same applying
to cold-water ports. This will help easily distinguish these ports from each other during
analysis and maintain clarity.
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New Trade Routes in the Arctic Ocean
Arguably the strongest of the “soft powers,”
trade is a staple of economic power. As climate changes causes the sea ice in the arctic
to recede, a new corridor will open for yearround travel from the North Sea to Barents
Straits. This route will allow for travel that
is not only thirty percent faster by some estimates, 16 but will be far safer than current
sea lanes which traverse highly dangerous
waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indonesian
Archipelago. The most critical aspect of this
is that the near entirety of the route moves
through Russian waters, giving them unparalleled control over what could soon be a
vital sea lane. The ever present influence of
offensive realism driven foreign policy decisions has already begun to show itself with
respect to this opportunity, as these new sea
lanes are already being used for global trade.
Though Chinese maritime analyst Gary Li
believes that it requires “another twenty or
thirty years of climate change to make it
fully viable,” the number of ships using these
routes increases with every year.17 According
to the Northern Sea Route Information, an
NGO specializing in promoting such trade
routes, seventy-one vessels traversed arctic
trade routes in 2013, up from forty-six the
previous year.18 Out of those vessels, the vast
majority were of Russian origin. Though this
pales in comparison to the estimated seventeen thousand of all nationalities which pass
through the Suez Canal each year, it is still

considerable growth for a previously unused
passage.19 This relates to offensive realism,
because it is a rapid capitalization of a potential opportunity for growth.
Another benefit of this new sea lane
is its proximity to Russian ports. With immediate access to the newly opened arctic
sea lanes, port cities such as Murmansk and
Vladivostok will become far more valuable
for trade than ever before. In fact, should the
trade routes in the north become as successful as some predict, it can be argued that
northern ports would become far more valuable than any other in Russia.
Emerging Fossil Fuel Access in the Arctic
Circle
As the ice caps continue to melt across
the Arctic, they will begin to expose vast
amounts of previously inaccessible fossil fuel
deposits in the process.20 Russia currently
holds the largest arctic claim of any other
country, already giving it a strong advantage
against competitors for these resources.21
Though oil prices are currently in a period
of stagnation, global reserves are not finite.
Current prices are a result of changes in
production across OPEC states and increasing growth in North America, a situation
that will certainly not last forever as global
demand continues to increase with the economic growth of the global south.22
Russia’s economic development over the
past decade has been largely dictated by the
export of oil and natural gas.23 This fact has
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been made itself rather visible in the current
Russian federal budget, which has seen a great
deal of cuts across the board.24 Though some
experts argue that this may be due to simultaneous sanctions imposed by the west in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis, there is a strong
correlation between oil prices in Russian GDP
during that period of time.25
A Russian drive to occupy the arctic
would be verification of the offensive realism
component of cold-water transition theory in
action, as it would indicate a proactive effort to
secure economic interests. This is, in fact, already happening. In early August of 2015, the
Russian Federation submitted to the United
Nations a territorial claim of more than 1.2
million square kilometers of ocean in the Arctic
Ocean.26,27,28 This claim was made on the basis
of the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea,
which dictates that a state may lay claim on
waters that extend up to two-hundred miles
from its continental shelf.29 Though these
waters were technically still able to be claimed
before the recession of the Arctic ice shelf, the
opening of accessibility and exploration of fossil
fuel resources on the seabed in these regions is

very likely to have prompted this action. Within
these newly claimed waters, the Russian Ministry of Mineral Resources believes there to be
up to thirty-six billion barrels in oil and natural
gas reserves.30,31 In current valuation of these
resources, this would be worth over thirty trillion dollars.
Russia’s push into the Arctic for financial gain is a clear indicator of offensive realist
theory at work. As mineral resources and economic opportunity become available, theory
dictates that they will capitalize on these opportunities. This is important, because it can help
us predict future actions by actors within the
region and verifying by proxy many of the other
points of analysis.
Defense Trends in the Arctic Circle
Another benefit of the retreat of Arctic sea ice
is the now unhindered access to both Atlantic
and Pacific oceans from Russian naval bases
along the Kola Peninsula to Vladivostok in the
Far East. In a theoretical conflict with NATO,
control over the Atlantic supply routes connecting North America with Western Europe would
be a decisive tool for either side.32 Though
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St. Petersburg and the Black Sea ports are
active year-round, they both require passage
through geographic bottlenecks controlled by
NATO powers such as the Denmark Strait in
the Baltic and the Bosporus Strait in Turkey.
For Russia or the former Soviet Union, the
only clear route to the Atlantic originates from
bases on the Kola Peninsula or Western Siberia. While in the past these bases would have
been difficult or impossible to use during the
harsh winter months, climate change and the
development of icebreakers have made them
capable of remaining active year-round.33,34
Though there are no immediate indications of
a change in military doctrine along the Arctic
Circle, Russia and the former Soviet Union
have already made extensive use of arctic
waters in their strategic nuclear planning.
Unlike the United States, which dispersed its nuclear ballistic missile carrying
submarines (SSBNs) across the world’s oceans
in the hopes of using the vast expanses of
water to hide, Soviet strategy took a much
different approach.35 Soviet strategic planners
chose to use their geographic positioning to
their advantage, using the vast expanses of
sea ice and natural gulfs to create a defensive
shield to cover their submarines in is known as
Bastion Defense Doctrine. By hiding submarines beneath ice sheets and patrolling natural
bottlenecks in the Barents and Sea of Okhotsk,
it was believed that Soviet SSBNs could be
protected long enough during a conflict to
launch their nuclear payloads in a first or
second strike capacity. In this way, cold-water
ports have already showed their importance
to Russian foreign policy long before climate

change provided additional opportunities. This
is yet another example of offensive realism at
play, as the previously useless ice sheets in regions such as the Barents Sea were viewed as
opportunities to grow power and seized upon.
Given this history, it can be predicted that
planners will again attempt to find and seize
upon advantages in the changing meteorological conditions for military use. In doing so,
Russia will continue to lessen its dependence
on warm-water ports and grow military power
in the Arctic Circle.
III. Opposing Arguments
As with anything else, there are two sides to
this argument. On one side are the arguments
which I have made in its support, and on the
other are potential arguments against it. In this
section I will attempt to address possible criticism of my thesis and analysis. Because this
is not based on a currently circulated theory,
but rather a new one based on many emerging trends, it would be next to impossible to
find direct opposition. What I have gathered to
present as a dissenting voice is a compilation of
potential arguments based on current trends in
foreign policy. They are by no means the only
possible arguments; however, I feel these are
the most important to immediately consider
with respect to my analysis.
The most obvious response to the assertions made in this paper would be that ports
such as St. Petersburg and Sevastopol are
critical to Russia economically and militarily.
Indeed, St. Petersburg is the second strongest
Russian city economically by reported GDP as
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valued by the Brookings Institute, second only
in the country to Moscow and comparable to
Charlotte or Cleveland in the United States.36
Its proximity to the rest of Europe and use as
the base of operations for the Russian Baltic
Fleet also make a strong case for its continuing importance to Russian trade and naval
power.37
Even if Russian interests in the arctic
continue to increase, it can be strongly argued
that Russia will continue to have concern for
developments in the remaining part of the
globe beneath the Arctic Circle. The current
Russian military action against ISIS is one
such current event that can be used to highlight this point. Russian movements in support
of the Assad regime make use of ports around
the Black Sea and in Syria, in the same way
that they could be used for other operations
across the Middle East.38 Based on these
events, a case can be made that so long as developments outside of the Arctic Circle influence Russian economic and political standing;
it will continue to require warm-water ports to
compete for global power.
Critics of cold-water transition theory
would of course have many critiques relating
directly to current events. Russia’s moves in
the Black Sea and Syria are contrary to the
idea of a shift towards arctic power. This is not
without strong reasoning, as Syrian ports in
the Mediterranean are vital to power projection and the port of Sevastopol in Crimea can

be considered the jewel of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet.39,40 Actions in Syria and Ukraine can
be considered evidence that Russia continues
to pursue southern ports.
Even while remaining within the realm
of offensive realism, it can be argued that
these actions are further proof that Russian
foreign policy is making use of offensive realism to expand power outside of the arctic and
would potentially do so in the future as part of
a global strategy. In Syria, it is speculated that
Russian support for the Assad regime is not
only based on the trade of arms, but assurance
of the continued use of the only permanent
Russian naval base outside of the Russian
territory.41 If this is correct, then it would fit
well with an offensive realist narrative of pursuing every possible point of power expansion
around the world.
In response to these criticisms, I have a
number of rebuttals. Though there are many
valid points to be made in opposition to the
idea of a shift away from warm-water ports,
I believe that these arguments are largely
unable to conclusively prove a requirement for
warm-water ports in the future. With regards
to the argument in favor of a continued requirement for warm-water ports built upon
strong reasoning, I do not believe that this
criticism would necessarily disprove cold-water
transition theory. In the coming decades, fossil
fuel resources in the Middle East are expected
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to decline with continued use, allowing for a shift of
power towards the next frontier in oil and natural
gas, the Arctic Ocean.42 Even in the very likely scenario that global hotspots for military and economic activity continue to appear outside of the Arctic
Circle, the opening of access to northern ports will
allow for power to be projected from those harbors
without need for others in warmer waters.43,44,45 As
was discussed in the military section of the analysis, the recession of sea ice will provide cold-water
ports with easy access to both Pacific and Atlantic
oceans, and by extension, the rest of the world.
Under this reasoning, I would argue that Russia
could continue to function at a similar capacity
militarily and economically in a situation where
it no longer had the ability to use its warm-water
harbors. This would be in keeping with my thesis,
which states that Russia no longer requires access
to the sea to remain a global power.
In relation to the question of Russian activity in Syria, there are a number of factors at
play in this decision. From a strategic standpoint,
the Mediterranean would most likely be blocked
at both exits during a conflict with the west. The
only potential use of Syrian ports would be to
contest NATO forces in the Mediterranean while
being completely isolated from the rest of the
Russian Navy and Air Force.46 Though this would
be a thorn in the side of NATO forces in Southern
European and would require a diversion of resources from other theaters, the considerable air and
sea power of France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and
of course the US and UK would no doubt be overwhelming for and Russian fleet. This is of course

before even considering the proximity of this port
to NATO bases in Turkey. While these bases are
certainly useful during peacetime for supply and
maintenance purposes, they would be isolated from
the Russian mainland during a conflict with the
West. Altogether, I would assert that these responses effectively counter the most obvious criticisms to my analysis and the thesis it supports.
IV. Conclusion
After considerable analysis and discussion of the
impact that global climate change will have on the
politics of the Arctic Circle, along with the resulting changes in oceanic access from traditionally
cold-water ports, a clear picture can be made of
current and future events. The picture made in
this analysis points towards a shift in possible Russian power from traditionally warm-water ports to
cold-water ones along the Arctic Circle. Based upon
the supporting evidence for this assertion, it can
be concluded that the thesis argument that Russia
no longer needs to pursue and control traditionally
warm-water ports to maintain its economic and
military power is based upon sound reasoning.
Though critics may be able to argue that a modern
Russia cannot live without its southern ports, the
evidence brought to support cold-water transition
theory has delivered a clear argument for a decisive change in what has been fundamental Russian foreign policy for more than three hundred
years. What was once a hindrance to its ability
to ability to become global superpower, Russia’s
cold-water ports will soon become the key to its
reentry as a power player on the world stage.
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